Tag Archives: housejudiciarycommittee

Misconceptions About GSU Electronic Reserves, Coursepacks and the Media Neutrality Doctrine

In recent testimony (both written and oral) at the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Hearing on Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired, Allan Adler, representing the Association of American Publishers, asserted that in the Georgia State e-reserves case, the Eleventh Circuit erred in rejecting applicability of the media neutrality doctrine, the principle that copyright law should apply in a similar manner to similar works in different media. Invoking the media neutrality doctrine, Mr. Adler essentially argued that the “coursepack” cases – Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services – should control and that the use of copyrighted material in Georgia State’s e-reserves was not fair use. This argument ignores several important points regarding the facts of the case, including the fact that the coursepack cases were distinguishable on grounds that had nothing to do with media neutrality.

First, the coursepack cases do not apply because material placed in electronic reserves are not the equivalent of material that is collected and bound together in a coursepack. A coursepack is like an anthology sold to all the students in a course, which the students can place on their bookshelves and continue to use long after the end of the course. By contrast, in an e-reserves system, the university provides students with temporary access privileges that terminate at the end of the semester. A student can continue to access the materials that were in the course e-reserves only if the student became the volitional actor by printing out the materials while she still had access to them. That copying by a student for her personal use unquestionably is a fair use. The media neutrality doctrine applies only in cases where the cases are truly analogous.

Additionally, the coursepack cases are not controlling because the circumstances of those cases were very different than the facts in Georgia State. In particular, the coursepack cases clearly involved commercial, for-profit copy shops and the coursepacks were sold to students for a profit. By contrast, the e-reserves at issue were run by Georgia State University, a non-profit educational institution and the use was also a non-profit, educational use. This distinction is significant under the first fair use factor which looks at “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in rejecting the coursepack cases that in these cases:

. . . the nontransformative, educational use in question was performed by a for-profit copyshop, and was therefore commercial . . . [Courts have] refused to allow the defendants, who were engaged in commercial operations, to stand in the shoes of students and professors in claiming that their making of multiple copies of scholarly works was for nonprofit educational purposes.

However, in both of the coursepack cases, the courts expressly declined to conclude that the copying would fall outside the boundaries of fair use if conducted by professors, students, or academic institutions. See Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (“As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt. We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that the copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise.”); Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n.13 (“Expressly, the decision of this court does not consider copying performed by students, libraries, nor on-campus copyshops, whether conducted for-profit or not.”).

Reliance on the coursepack cases is therefore misguided as they involved off-campus, for-profit copy shops rather than non-profit educational institutions. The courts in these coursepack cases explicitly note that the holdings of these cases do not reach the issue of copying by students, professors, libraries, or the academic institutions. In Georgia State, the e-reserves system was clearly run by the university. The coursepack cases are therefore distinguishable based on the analysis done under the first fair use factor.

Additionally, the coursepack cases are clearly not binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit. These cases were decided in different jurisdictions – in a district court in New York and by the Sixth Circuit – and therefore not controlling. While the decisions in these cases may have had persuasive value, even if they had analogous fact patterns such opinions would not bind the Eleventh Circuit.

Finally, the decisions are more than 15 years old. Fair use jurisprudence is always evolving. There is no way to know if courts in the Second and Sixth Circuits would reach the same conclusion today that they reached in the last millennium.

While the media neutrality doctrine is an important copyright principle, it – and the coursepack cases – simply do not apply in the Georgia State decision. The Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected this holdings in this line of cases when considering the fair use of Georgia State’s e-reserves system.

LCA Submits Testimony to House Judiciary Subcommittee for Copyright Review Hearing on Technological Protection Measures

On September 17, 2014, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet continued its copyright review with a hearing on Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act, which governs technological protection measures (TPM). The hearing included four witnesses: Mr. Mark Richert, Director of Public Policy, American Foundation for the Blind; Mr. Jonathan Zuck, President, ACT | The App Association; Mr. Christian Genetski, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel, Entertainment Software Association; and Ms. Corynne McSherry; Intellectual Property Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation.

The Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) submitted a statement to the Subcommittee in advance of the hearing.

The LCA testimony points out that overly-broad anti-circumvention language was initially proposed in 1994 and 1995 over objections that these prohibitions could prevent circumvention for lawful purposes. After the 1996 adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), PTO Commissioner Lehman proposed new anti-circumvention language to implement the treaties. Again, the proposals were overly broad, regulating both tools and conduct, regulating circumvention apart from underlying infringement and governing circumvention for both access-control technologies and copy-control technologies rather than only prohibiting copying. Significantly, the WIPO treaties did not require these overly-broad features, as Commissioner Lehman himself conceded when testifying before the House Judiciary Subcommittee.

Despite the fact that alternative proposals were made to address these overly-broad proposals, “Congress instead created a set of complex exceptions and limitations to the administration’s sweeping language, resulting in the convoluted, inconsistent section 1201 we have today. Some of these limitations are of limited effectiveness.” Additionally, Congress, in recognition that additional exceptions other than those explicitly included in Section 1201 may be desirable, directed the Librarian of Congress to conduct a rulemaking process every three years to determine additional classes of works that should be granted an exemption for the subsequent three-year period. However, as the LCA testimony points out, “A narrower section 1201 limited to circumvention that led to infringement would have obviated the need for the rulemaking procedure altogether.”

Over the years, there have been several efforts to amend section 1201 to address the potential problems resulting from an interpretation of this section as prohibiting circumvention of access controls or the manufacture and distribution of circumvention tools, even if they are for non-infringing purposes. These bills have varied from creating additional specific exceptions to requiring a nexus between circumvention and infringement. Most recently, controversy over the Librarian of Congress’ 2012 decision not to renew an exemption for cell phone unlocking that had been granted in previous rulemakings, resulted in renewed efforts to address flaws in Section 1201. Although Representatives Lofgren (D-CA), Massie (R-KY), Eshoo (D-CA) and Polis (D-CO) introduced a broad bill, the Unlocking Technology Act of 2013, that would have permitted circumvention for non-infringing uses, ultimately Congress took a narrower approach and adopted a temporary fix specific to the problem of cell phone unlocking.

The LCA testimony also includes a summary of litigation over Section 1201, explaining that currently a circuit split exists as to whether the language of 1201 requires a nexus between infringement and circumvention for liability to attach.

Additionally, the LCA testimony covers the three-year rulemaking process, which LCA members have participated in during each cycle. The testimony points out some of the absurdities of the process as well as the high costs and burdens of participating in the rulemaking cycle. The testimony points out that “From start to finish, the process can take more than a year” and that the inefficient system places burdens on not only the proponents of exemptions, but the Copyright Office, as well.

The testimony concludes with several proposed amendments to Section 1201 including:

  • Attaching liability to circumvention only if it enables infringement
  • Placing the burden of proof on those opposing renewal of exemptions to demonstrate why it should not be renewed or should be modified
  • Making exemptions permanent if a second renewal is granted
  • Shifting final rulemaking authority from the Librarian of Congress to the Assistant Secretary for Communication and Information of the Department of Commerce

LCA Statement on Copyright Remedies for House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing

On July 24, 2014, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet continued its copyright review with a hearing on copyright remedies. Witnesses at this hearing include Mr. David Bitkower, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Mr. Steven M. Tepp, President and Chief Executive Officer, Sentinel Worldwide; Mr. Matt Schruers, Vice President for Law and Policy, Computer & Communications Industry Association; Mr. Sherwin Siy, Vice President of Legal Affairs, Public Knowledge; and Ms. Nancy E. Wolff, Partner, Cowan DeBaets, Abrahams & Sheppard LLP.

The Library Copyright Alliance filed a statement for the hearing, focusing on the problems with statutory damages. The statement notes that the existing safe harbor requiring a court to remit statutory damages when a library, archive, educational institution or public broadcasting entity believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that its use constituted fair use applies only to the reproduction right. The statement recommends an update to reflect the digital era so that this safe harbor applies to any type of use, including those implicating performance, display, distribution or derivative work rights.

Copyright Term Myths and Facts

The written testimony of four of the five witnesses speaking at the July 15, 2014 House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty and Copyright Term, address the issue of copyright term. Notably, none of these witnesses suggest that the current term be extended further and Professor of Law Michael Carroll argues that the current term of protection is too long. Although the other witnesses did not propose extension of copyright, it should be noted that Rick Carnes, President of the Songwriters Guild of America, asserts that the current copyright term in the United States is appropriate and should not be shortened. Although he devotes only a single paragraph to the issue of copyright term, his written testimony nonetheless contains statements that are misleading or untrue.

Myth 1: The current copyright term represents the international standard.
Mr. Carnes’ written testimony asserts that “suggestions that the United States should break with the rest of the world to reduce the current term of copyright protection (designed specifically to allow creators to address the economic welfare of their families for a time period limited basically to the lives of their grandchildren) in order to stimulate ‘faster growth of the public domain’ should be rejected outright.”

Fact: The copyright term in the United States extends well beyond the Berne Convention’s standard and beyond the term of protection in the majority of countries.
Many countries’ copyright terms are set by the international agreements to which they are bound. The Berne Convention sets the minimum copyright term as the life of the author plus fifty years. The current term of protection in the United States is set at a period of the life of the author plus an additional seventy years. For corporate works or “works for hire,” the period of protection is set at ninety-five years. These terms far exceed what is required by international law.

Reducing the copyright term to the Berne standard would not “break with the rest of the world” as suggested by Mr. Carnes. The vast majority of countries use the Berne standard of life plus fifty years; there are almost twice as many countries with a period of protection shorter than the current term in the United States than there are countries with a period of life plus seventy years or greater.

Myth 2: The U.S. Copyright Office considers the current copyright term as proper.
Mr. Carnes’ written testimony asserts that the “U.S. Copyright Office, Congress and the United States Supreme Court have considered this issue on numerous occasions and determined that the current term of copyright protection established under Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution is not only proper, but serves the dual purpose of supporting the marketplace of ideas by encouraging professional creativity and bolstering the U.S. economy and balance of trade as well.”

Fact: The U.S. Copyright Office has questioned the value of a lengthy copyright term.
As noted in the LCA statement, Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante has suggested that the current copyright term in the United States may not be beneficial. Ms. Pallante noted in a 2013 speech:

The benefits of a lengthy term are meaningless if the current owner of the work cannot be identified or cannot be located. Often times, this is complicated by the fact that the current owner is not the author or even the author’s children or grandchildren. As the Copyright Office recognized in one of its key revision studies of the 1950s, it seems questionable whether copyright term should be extended to benefit remote heirs or assignees, “long after the purpose of the protection has been achieved.”

The Copyright Office has clearly expressed its concerns regarding copyright terms extending well beyond the life of the author and Mr. Carnes’ assertion that the Copyright Office has determined that a period of life plus seventy years is appropriate is simply untrue.

Further, in recognition of the harms that the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act has caused, Ms. Pallante has proposed the reintroduction of formalities for the last twenty years of protection.

Myth 3: The Supreme Court has determined the current copyright term is proper.
Mr. Carnes also asserts that the Supreme Court has endorsed the present copyright term as proper, a misreading of Eldred v. Ashcroft.

Fact: The Supreme Court never addressed the question of whether a period of protection of life plus seventy years was appropriate. The Court only upheld the power of Congress to set the term and extend the term retroactively.
The majority opinion in Eldred, while upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act, never addressed the propriety or benefits of the extension itself. Instead, the court addressed “the authority the Constitution assigns to Congress to prescribe the duration of copyrights.” As Justice Stevens’ dissent further points out, the question of “whether the extraordinary length of the grants authorized by the 1998 Act are invalid because they are the functional equivalent of perpetual copyrights is a question that need not be answered in this case because the question presented by the certiorari petition merely challenges Congress’ power to extend retroactively the terms of existing copyrights.”

The Court, by a 7-2 margin, interpreted the term “limited Times” as meaning “confined within certain bounds, “restrained,” or “circumscribed” and found that extending the copyright term by twenty years did not exceed this prescription. The majority then noted that on the question of whether the extension was a “rational exercise of legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause … we defer substantially to Congress.” The Court went on to state that the act “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.” Justice Stevens’ dissent notes that, “Fairly read, the Court has stated that congress’ actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intent and purposes, judicially unreviewable.”

Notably, the Court states that in finding that the extension was a rational exercise of authority, “we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.” The majority never decides whether the extension to the present term of life plus seventy is appropriate and could, arguably, be interpreted as suggesting that the extension might be unwise.

While neither the majority nor Justice Steven’s dissent address the appropriateness of the copyright term extension, Justice Breyer’s dissent vigorously opposes the extension as violating the Constitutional rationale of the intellectual property system:

The economic effect of this 20-year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s founding—is to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual. Its primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but their heirs, estates or corporate successors. And most importantly, its practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of “Science”—by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge.

LCA Statement Opposing Copyright Term Extension at House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing

On July 15, 2014, the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet continued its copyright review with a Hearing on Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty and Copyright Term. The Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) filed a statement addressing the topic of copyright term, noting the negative effects that lengthy copyright terms have on the public domain.

The statement notes that the Constitutional rationale for intellectual property protection is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by security for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Supreme Court has interpreted this rationale as having an “ultimate aim … to stimulate creativity for the general public good.”

The statement then goes through the history of copyright term in the United States, which was initially a limited period of fourteen years, with the possibility of renewal for an additional fourteen years, a period far shorter than the current term of the life of the author plus an additional seventy years. It also points out that while patents and copyrights originally had similar periods of protection, the patent term has increased by only 43 percent while the copyright term has increased by almost 580 percent.

Copyright term extensions hinder the goal of “stimulat[ing] creativity for the general public good” by shrinking the public domain. The public domain is essential to allowing access to books and texts, and also promoting future creativity by providing raw materials upon which artists and authors can build. Longer copyright terms escalate the costs of access to knowledge by requiring licenses for a greater period of time and increasing the resources that must be devoted to finding the rightsholder.

The statement also points out that a copyright term that extends beyond the life of the author exacerbates the orphan works problem. Maria Pallante, Register of Copyrights, has noted that the Copyright Office recognized in a study “it seems questionable whether copyright term should be extended to benefit remote heirs or assignees, ‘long after the purpose of the protection has been achieved.’”

Additionally, the statement calls for evidence based copyright policy. It points to the independent Hargreaves report commissioned by the United Kingdom as well as an article published in the Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, both of which point out that the economic evidence does not support copyright term extensions, including the current lengthy term that exists in the United States.

Finally, the statement recommends that Congress explore ways to shorten the present term or mitigate its harms, for example, by considering Ms. Pallante’s proposal to reintroduce formalities for the final twenty years of copyright protection.

Greg Cram of The New York Public Library Represents Library Perspective on the First Sale Doctrine at House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing

On Monday, June 2, 2014, the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet continued with its copyright review with a [field hearing held in New York, NY](Greg Cram of The New York Public Library to Represent Library Perspective on the First Sale Doctrine at House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing). This hearing focused on the first sale doctrine, a principle that provides that after the first sale of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work, the copyright holder’s distribution rights in that particular copy terminate.

The panel included nine witnesses: Stephen M. Smith, President and CEO of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; John Ossenmacher, CEO of ReDigi; Ed Shems of edfredned illustration & graphic design; Jonathan Band representing the Owner’s Rights Initiative, Matthew B. Glotzer, Greg Cram, Associate Director of Copyright and Information Policy at The New York Public Library; Sherwin Siy, Vice President of Legal Affairs at Public Knowledge; John Villasenor, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Public Policy at UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs; and Emery Smith, Counselor for BSA – The Software Alliance.

The Library Copyright Alliance endorsed Cram’s statement, which highlights the importance of the first sale doctrine to the mission of libraries. Cram also states support for the Supreme Court’s ruling last year in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, applying the first sale doctrine to a lawful physically copy of a work regardless of the place of manufacture or sale. He also discusses the issue of first sale in the context of the digital marketplace.

Importance of First Sale to Libraries

In his statement, Cram notes that throughout American history, even prior to the founding of the nation, libraries have promoted democratic values by lending books and other materials. In discussing the history of libraries providing access to information, Cram quotes Thomas Jefferson: “I have often thought that nothing would do more extensive good at small expense than the establishment of a small circulating library in every county, to consist of a few well-chosen books, to be lent to the people of the county under regulations as would secure their safe return in due time.”

Cram’s statement points out that Americans borrow books and other materials from libraries 4.4 billion times a year and that per capita circulation grew by 26.1% between 2000 and 2009. Between 2008 and 2012, NYPL saw a 44% increase in circulation with 28 million items circulated in 2012. The vast majority of library collections represent physical copies of works, highlighting the importance of the first sale doctrine, without which library lending would not be possible.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons

In his written testimony, Cram expresses support for the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2013 in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, an opinion which found in favor of international exhaustion, a rule applying the first sale doctrine to lawful copies of copyrighted works regardless of the place of manufacture or sale. Without a rule of international exhaustion, library lending would be seriously threatened as more than 200 million books in U.S. libraries have foreign publishers. Books published by U.S. publishers are often manufactured by printers in other countries, often without any indications on the copyright page of where they were printed. As a result, libraries have no way of knowing whether the books were manufactured domestically or abroad. With large portions of collections manufactured abroad, the Kirtsaeng decision is crucial in allowing libraries to continue their acquisition and circulation policies. Cram concludes, “This is the right rule for libraries and for American consumers, and Congress should not disturb it.”

Digital First Sale

Cram’s statement also explains the complexities of the use of digital resources as libraries increasingly license electronic resources. Licenses set the terms under which a library can make the content available and such terms can vary:

Often, the content is hosted on the server of the publisher or other intermediary, and the library is buying access to the server for its users. An authorized user might be able to download the content onto her computer or device, and digital rights management software will allow the content to reside there until it is automatically deleted in accordance with the license term … Currently, for most popular trade titles a library contracts with vendors to enable users to check out a licensed title based on the print “one copy, one user” model. Libraries must license additional e-book files in order to lend to more than one user at the same time. After a prescribed period, the book is automatically returned and becomes immediately available for digital check out by another user. Other licenses might not allow digital download, but instead permit a user to print out a limited number of pages, e.g., a journal article. Other licenses permit users to access content only when the user is connected to the Internet, e.g., streaming access.

While acknowledging that the digital marketplace has provided certain advantages over the traditional model (libraries no longer need to repair torn pages or place the books on a physical shelf), Cram also points out several drawbacks. Under the print model, a book can remain in a library’s collection until it wears out, but in the digital environment, a library can only provide access when it has paid the licensing fees and the terms of renewal licenses may vary. Cram explains that under some licensing models, arbitrary circulation limits are enforced and that license rates for e-books “can be more expensive than its print counterpart, and sometimes more than ten times the consumer e-book price.” Furthermore, some publishers do not license e-books to libraries at all. The current model also raises serious concerns regarding preservation of materials.

With respect to the digital marketplace, the Cram concludes:

Congress needs to consider whether to prohibit the enforcement of contractual limitations on copyright exceptions in certain circumstances. Significantly, the suite of statutory instruments for amending the UK copyright law that will come into force on June 1, 2014, prohibit the “contracting out” of many exceptions in the research and education context. Congress therefore needs to closely monitor the evolving digital marketplace to ensure that it is sufficiently competitive to provide widespread public access to works.

Observations from House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Surveillance and FISA Reforms

On February 4, 2014, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on “Examining Recommendations to Reform FISA Authorities.” The written testimony of the six witnesses and the statement of Chairman Goodlatte (R-VA) are available here. Ranking Member Conyers’ (D-MI) opening statement is available here.

The witnesses were divided into two panels. The first panel included James Cole (Department of Justice), Peter Swire (President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology), and David Medine (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). The second panel included Steven Bradbury (Dechert, LLP), Dean Garfield (Information Technology Industry Council) and David Cole (Georgetown University Law Center). The vast majority of the time and questioning from Members of Congress was spent on the first panel.

The focus of the hearing was on Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (the section known as the library records provision under which the NSA claimed authority to collect bulk data of telephone records; this provision could also be used to obtain other “business records” including library records). Some questions also covered the Section 702 program, which targets non-U.S. persons. The majority of the Committee members appeared to support reforms to the program, with numerous members pointing to their support for the USA FREEDOM Act. Several members also focused on the need to restore trust amongst the American people.

During opening statements, Chairman Goodlatte noted that President Obama had not articulated how the bulk collection of telephony metadata had thwarted terrorist plots. He also questioned the President’s proposal to transfer the storage of bulk data to private companies, pointing to recent security breaches of Target and Yahoo!.

Ranking Member Conyers called the Section 215 bulk collection program ineffective, inconsistent with American values and inconsistent with the statutory language. He pointed out that Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act is scheduled to sunset on June 1, 2015 and if the bulk collection issue is not addressed, the Government risks losing Section 215 in its entirety. Conyers praised H.R. 3361, the USA FREEDOM Act, which has 130 House Members supporting the bill with an even split between Democrats and Republicans (Senator Leahy introduced an identical bill in the Senate), a point reiterated by several other members of the Judiciary Committee. The bill, among other things, would amend Section 215 to prohibit bulk collection and require showing a nexus between the business records sought and the person targeted.

First Panel

James Cole, Deputy Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), statement focused on President Obama’s January 17, 2014 speech laying out proposed reforms, including having third party storage of the bulk data, establishing an independent voice before the FISA courts, and establishing greater transparency. He also argued that the bulk collection of telephony metadata was constitutional and permitted under the PATRIOT Act.

Several members questioned Cole regarding the value of the bulk collection of telephone data and the appropriate metric in assessing its benefits. He repeatedly asserted that the program was useful and that pointing to the number of terrorist plots thwarted was not an appropriate metric in assessing the value of the Section 215 program, though Cole did not provide an alternative metric other than to call the program “helpful.”

Peter Swire of the President’s Review Group (PRG) gave an overview of the makeup of the review group and the scope of their report. He noted that while the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board had done legal analysis around the statutory language of Section 215 and the First and Fourth Amendments, this analysis was not undertaken by the President’s Review Group.

In response to criticisms regarding the risks of permitting third parties to house the bulk data, particularly in light of security breaches, Swire pointed out that the NSA has had leaks and all databases are at risk. He also noted that telephone companies already collect the data and requiring them to store such data would not create any new harms.

David Medine, Chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), gave an overview of the conclusions of the recently issued report on Section 215, noting that PCLOB would be issuing a separate report on Section 702 in the coming months. He pointed to the PCLOB’s majority conclusion that the Section 215 program violated the statutory parameters of the PATRIOT Act, but also raised serious concerns regarding the First and Fourth Amendments. He noted that the benefits of bulk collection were “modest at best” and such benefits were outweighed by the concerns regarding civil liberties and privacy. The Board recommended termination of the Section 215 bulk collection program.

Medine also pointed out that the Administration’s interpretation of Section 215 takes an overly expansive view of the term “relevant.” He noted that Congress intended to put limits on Section 215 when it was created, but that these limits were ignored with an interpretation that “relevant” covered everything.

Representative Sensenbrenner (R-WI) pointed out that he was the principal author of the PATRIOT Act as well as its two reauthorizations (Sensenbrenner also introduced the USA FREEDOM Act into the House) and that the revelations about how Section 215 was being used were a shock, a sentiment later echoed by Representative Lofgren (D-CA). Sensenbrenner asserted that there was no way that the PATRIOT Act, as interpreted by the Administration, would have been approved or reauthorized if debated in Congress and that no fair reading of the Act could support the bulk collection of telephony metadata. When Cole stated that the DOJ had not taken a position on the USA Freedom Act, Sensenbrenner suggested that the DOJ quickly take a position because the Government is faced with a choice between the USA Freedom Act or having no authority when June 1, 2015 comes around and Section 215 expires. These sentiments were echoed by Representative Nadler (D-NY)

Representative Bachus (R-AL) seemed to be one of the few Committee members that did not want to see changes made to the program. He cited a letter by Judge John Bates, which expressed concerns in allowing a public advocate participate in FISA Court hearings.

Representative Lofgren (D-CA) asked what data, other than telephone data, could be collected. She asked whether credit card information or Internet browser cookies could be collected. Cole argued that not everything could be collected, only what was “necessary.”

Both Lofgren and Representative Issa (R-CA) asked whether the telephony metadata of Members of Congress had been collected. Swire said that to his knowledge, nothing had been screened out. Cole agreed that there was no reason to think otherwise, but argued that because the data had been collected into a database did not mean that it had been looked at. Issa also asked whether telephony metadata of the Executive Branch, including the President’s, as well as the records of the numerous embassies in the United States, had also been collected and Cole stated that he believed every phone number’s metadata was included in the database.

Representative Poe (R-TX) asked Cole to name a criminal case that had been filed as a result of the metadata program. Cole stated that there may be one material support case, but argued that the point of the statute was not to pursue criminal cases but to gather foreign intelligence.

Second Panel:

Steven Bradbury, attorney at Dechert, LLP and former head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the DOJ, argued that the NSA programs did not violate any statutory or constitutional laws. He argued that numerous FISA court judges had upheld the programs. He also asserted that all Members of Congress were informed about or had the opportunity to be briefed on the details of the Section 215 and 702 programs during their reauthorizations. He stated that the programs were critically important and argued against any changes, expressing disappointment with President Obama’s proposals to reform the programs.

Dean Garfield, President and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council, pointed to the impacts that the revelations about bulk collection of data have had on the information and communications technology sector. He stated that the revelations about the programs had eroded trust in U.S. companies and the security of the data they collect. He also warned that forcing localized storage could result in “Balkinization” of the Internet. He advocated for greater transparency and oversight, as well as clarification of what Section 215 permits.

Some members raised concerns about how U.S. companies could be disadvantaged globally as a result of the NSA revelations, a point on which Garfield agreed. He noted that concerns included cost, storage concerns, and the public lack of trust, including the perception that companies are not independent from the U.S. Government.

David Cole, Professor of Constitutional Law and National Security at Georgetown University Law Center, expressed support for the USA FREEDOM Act. He pointed out that because of evolving technology, privacy law must be adapted in light of the increased ease of collecting massive amounts of data. He also argued against defenders of the NSA collection practices by pointing out that the former NSA general counsel had stated that metadata can reveal an enormous amount about a person’s life and with enough metadata, content is unnecessary.

Chairman Goodlatte questioned Bradbury, pointing to concerns about privacy when bulk data is collected. Bradbury responded that there were hypothetical concerns about abuse, but these concerns did not match the reality of the programs. He also pointed out that the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also collect massive amounts of data and that the NSA should not be singled out.

Lofgren raised concerns regarding the expectations of privacy in the modern world. In response, Cole stated that the defining question is how to preserve the right to privacy in the face of new technologies and that it was the responsibility of Congress to address these issues. He said that without Congressional action, there is a risk of surrendering privacy to the digital age.

Representative Nadler called the FISA court a “kangaroo court” because of its one-sided and secretive nature. He pointed out that while technology evolves and metadata is collected, people still have an expectation of privacy. Cole then pointed out that the metadata collection programs were the same as issuing a general warrant.