Tag Archives: gsu

Library Copyright Alliance Files Amicus Brief in GSU E-Reserves Case

On Monday, February 13, 2017, ARL together with the American Libraries Association, Association of College and Research Libraries and the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an amicus brief in support of Georgia State University (GSU) in the e-reserves fair use case. After years of litigation and two opinions by the district court and one by the Eleventh Circuit, the case is once again before the Eleventh Circuit.

The brief opens by noting that that the continued appeals in the case are unnecessary:

Appellant Publishers (“Publishers”) and their amici don’t know when to quit. Publishers could have declared victory in 2009, when GSU modified its e-reserves policy in response to the initiation of this lawsuit. Publishers could have declared victory in 2014 after this Court reversed the district court’s 2012 decision and provided detailed guidance on how fair use principles should be applied to e-reserves. Publishers could have concluded this litigation after the district court refused to re-open the record on remand. Instead, Publishers doggedly pursue their claims concerning excerpts used in three school terms, eight years ago.

The brief then urges the Eleventh Circuit to affirm the lower court’s decision. In doing so, the brief notes that GSU’s copyright policy is consistent with the ARL Code of Best Practices for Academic and Research Libraries. The brief also suggests that the district court’s analysis of the second fair use factor (nature of the work) was flawed and the context of the works actually favors fair use. Finally, the brief notes the importance of the public interest in considering the fourth fair use factor (market harm).

On the second factor, the brief states that analysis of the second factor should be focused on “ascertain[ing] whether copyright was needed to incentivize creation and, by extension, whether or not a fair use finding helps serve the purposes of copyright.”  The brief points out that the scholarly community is a “gift culture” and while

We do not suggest that scholarly works should receive no copyright protection.  But we do agree with Judge Posner that copyright-based incentives are less necessary in the context of many academic works to serve copyright’s own fundamental goal: to further the progress of science.  Because scholarly works require “thinner” copyright protection to ensure their production, the second factor strongly favors a fair use finding with respect to all of the works at issue here.

With respect to the fourth factor, the brief points the constraints of library budgets and the growth of open access publishing.  It states that,

Placed in this context, it is clear that the public benefit of e-reserve practices such as GSU’s far outweighs any potential cost to publishers.  Although some academic publishers may have difficulty adjusting to the digital environment, predictions of the devastating impact the decision below would have on the evolving scholarly communications ecosystem are complete fiction.

A Deeper Dive Into the New Georgia State Decision

Last week, on March 31, 2016, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia released its opinion on remand in the Georgia State University e-reserves case.  The case had been remanded to the district court in October 2014 when the Eleventh Circuit directed the lower court to use a revised methodology for determining whether fair use applied.

While the district court originally found in 2012 that of the 99 instances of claimed infringement, 94 were non-infringing, in the new opinion only 48 cases were evaluated (due to the fact that the original ruling found that either no prima facie case for infringement had been made and the publishers did not appeal this portion of the ruling).  The new opinion’s conclusion finds that 41 of the 48 cases are fair uses, though as others have pointed out (and is discussed in an example below), some of the listed cases of infringement in the summary were found to be fair uses in the text of the opinion.  In fact, in reading the full opinion, it appears that 44 of the 48 cases were found to be fair uses.

Before doing a fair use analysis on each individual claimed infringement, Judge Evans explains here approach.  She notes that she will evaluate each factor individually, then weigh them together.  She also states that the analysis applied “will be specific to the nonprofit educational purpose of teaching and the nontransformative nature of the use (mirror image copying).”   This point is an important one as the analysis would not be the same in the vast majority of other fair use cases where the use would be considered transformative and therefore should not be used as guidance in transformative use cases.

Judge Evans explains her methodology for each factor.

Factor one: “Factor one will favor fair use in all cases.  It will not ‘strongly favor’ fair use.”

Factor two: Evaluated on the standard set by the Eleventh Circuit which requires Judge Evans to consider whether the information nature of the non-fiction books are mixed with opinion and scholarly writing.  Previously, Judge Evans presumed that the use of nonfiction works caused factor two to weigh in favor of fair use and the Eleventh Circuit rejected this presumption.  The Eleventh Circuit’s distinction between purely factual or deriving from the author’s opinions is troubling, but the appellate court acknowledged that it was a relatively unimportant factor.  Ultimately, Judge Evans finds that factor two is generally neutral and even where it weighs against fair use, because of the small weight afforded to this factor fair use may still prevail, mitigating the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal on this point.

Factor three: Factor three “will take into account the effect of the favored nonprofit educational purpose of the use under factor one, plus the impact of market substitution as recognized under factor four, in determining whether the quantity and substantiality (value) of Defendants’ unlicensed copying was excessive. All relevant record evidence will be considered; the factor three outcomes will vary.”  Factor three will no longer be guided by the approach Judge Evans took in 2012, which was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, in using a 10%/1 chapter rule.

Factor four: Judge Evans looks to whether licenses were available in 2009 and the factor “will initially favor Plaintiffs when digital permissions were available in 2009.”  However, she notes that the Eleventh Circuit held that the Defendants may demonstrate that “demand for excerpts of a particular copyrighted work was so limited that repetitive unpaid copying of excerpts from that work would have been unlikely even if unpaid copying of excerpts was a widespread practice in colleges and universities. In such a case the actions of Defendants in using unpaid excerpts would not have caused substantial damage to the potential market for the copyrighted work to such a degree that Plaintiffs would lose the incentive to publish the work. Defendants may also seek to prove that their actions . . . . did not substantially affect the value of the copyrighted work.”

She then discusses how the factors will be weighted, with factor four being given more weight and factor two given very little weight.  The opinion states, “This Court estimates the initial, approximate respective weights of the four factors as follows: 25% for factor one, 5% for factor two, 30% for factor three, and 40% for factor four.”

Under the new framework, Judge Evans rules that four of the claims were infringing; all four were also found to be infringing the first time she considered the case and therefore it was not particularly surprising that she ruled against fair use for these claims once again.  Three of these claims involved the same text, The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (both the second and third editions) and were assigned by the same professor.  In these three claims, the professor requested two, four and seven full chapters be uploaded (with additional requests for excerpts amounting to less than full chapters) be uploaded, respectively.

Ultimately, the case and opinion involves the narrow case of e-reserves and its analysis would not apply to transformative use cases.  Even in the case of e-reserves, it will be difficult to evaluate the fourth factor in the manner Judge Evans going forward because the financial data disclosed as a result of the litigation is not likely to be readily available.

Kevin Smith wisely points out that despite the fact that the opinion may not be widely applicable or easy to apply, there are important takeaways one of which is that libraries should find ways to improve the fair use case:

To my mind, this means that whenever we are faced with an e-reserves request that may not fall easily into fair use, we should look at ways to improve the fair use situation before we decide to license the excerpt.  Can we link to an already licensed version?  Can we shorten the excerpts?  Buying a separate license should be a last resort.

Ultimately, this opinion may have limited value in providing guidance going forward as it applies in a narrow context and had the benefit of data that isn’t readily available.  However, it is still a win for the libraries

New Decision in Georgia State University E-Reserves Case Released; 41 of 48 Claims of Infringement Found to Be Fair Uses

On March 31, 2016, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia released its opinion on remand in the Georgia State University e-reserves case, Cambridge University Press v. Becker.  The district court originally determined in 2012 that of the 99 instances of claimed infringement, 94 of the cases were fair use and only 5 were infringing.  The case appeared before the district court again after the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case in October 2014, directing the trial court to revisit its fair use analysis.  The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion rejected an arithmetic approach to the four fair use factors (that is, the idea that if three of the factors favor fair use, but one disfavors fair use, then fair use will always apply).

On remand, the district court considered 48 infringement claims and revisited the fair use assertions by Georgia State University.  Judge Evans found that of the 48 claims, 41 were non-infringing fair uses.  More analysis of the opinion will be available shortly.

H/T: Kevin Smith

Publishers File Motion to Reopen Record in GSU Electronic Reserves Case; GSU Opposes

On October 17, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in the Georgia State University e-reserve case, directing the lower court to revisit its fair use analysis and avoid using an arithmetic approach to the four factors (i.e., if three factors favor fair use but one does not, then fair use applies).  While the case was reversed and remanded, the Eleventh Circuit actually rejected many of the arguments advanced by the plaintiff publishers.  In its holding, the court affirmed that fair use is determined on a case-by-case basis, rejected bright-line rules, affirmed that even non-transformative uses may be a fair use, and rejected applicability of the coursepack cases.

The plaintiff publishers subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the Eleventh Circuit rejected in January.

On remand to the district court, on February 24, 2015, the publishers filed a motion to reopen the record.  The publishers claim the need for “evidence of GSU’s ongoing conduct (e.g. its use of E-Reserves during the most recent academic term).”  Essentially, the publishers are seeking a new trial with potentially new claims, rather than allowing Judge Evans to simply revisit the analysis used with respect to the existing claims-at-issue.

On March 13, 2015, GSU filed its opposition to the motion to reopen, noting that “The record here was fully developed at trial and is complete, and from it, this Court can” make a fair use determination.  As GSU points out, there is no reason to reopen the record because the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case based on the legal analysis rather than an incomplete factual record.

GSU also points out the burdensome nature of reopening the record:

The process of re-opened discovery that the Plaintiffs propose would be grossly burdensome–requiring Defendants to, among other things, collect substantial electronic and paper records and acquire the sworn statements of yet-undetermined number of faculty and staff.  The Court would then have to use its finite resources to start anew analyzing new individual allegations of infringement–and would (According to Plaintiffs’ plan) have to do so without the benefit of trial testimony on such things as the pedagogical purposes of the alleged uses.

GSU’s opposition goes on to explain that reopening the record would be unfair given that the publishers declined to stay the case while GSU was implementing its new policy on electronic reserves:

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Motion does not make any claims of prejudice to Plaintiffs.  Nor could Plaintiffs do so.  The Court will recall that Plaintiffs declined Defendants’ offer to stay this case during initial implementation of the Policy.  Having elected to proceed, Plaintiffs should not now be heard to complain of the record they insisted on presenting to this Court in the first place.

GSU points out that the publishers are essentially looking an entirely new trial:

The Eleventh Circuit’s and this Court’s thorough disposition of the legal and factual arguments advanced over years of litigation–including almost a month of trial testimony–simply cannot be a dry run for Plaintiffs’ “second go” at whole new allegations of infringement.

It seems clear from the publishers’ motion to reopen that they intend to aggressively pursue the case.  Given that the publishers were largely defeated the first time the case was heard in the district court and most of their arguments were rejected on appeal, it indeed seems that they want to treat the existing record as a “dry run” and now seek a new trial with a new set of allegations.


Misconceptions About GSU Electronic Reserves, Coursepacks and the Media Neutrality Doctrine

In recent testimony (both written and oral) at the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Hearing on Copyright Issues in Education and for the Visually Impaired, Allan Adler, representing the Association of American Publishers, asserted that in the Georgia State e-reserves case, the Eleventh Circuit erred in rejecting applicability of the media neutrality doctrine, the principle that copyright law should apply in a similar manner to similar works in different media. Invoking the media neutrality doctrine, Mr. Adler essentially argued that the “coursepack” cases – Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services – should control and that the use of copyrighted material in Georgia State’s e-reserves was not fair use. This argument ignores several important points regarding the facts of the case, including the fact that the coursepack cases were distinguishable on grounds that had nothing to do with media neutrality.

First, the coursepack cases do not apply because material placed in electronic reserves are not the equivalent of material that is collected and bound together in a coursepack. A coursepack is like an anthology sold to all the students in a course, which the students can place on their bookshelves and continue to use long after the end of the course. By contrast, in an e-reserves system, the university provides students with temporary access privileges that terminate at the end of the semester. A student can continue to access the materials that were in the course e-reserves only if the student became the volitional actor by printing out the materials while she still had access to them. That copying by a student for her personal use unquestionably is a fair use. The media neutrality doctrine applies only in cases where the cases are truly analogous.

Additionally, the coursepack cases are not controlling because the circumstances of those cases were very different than the facts in Georgia State. In particular, the coursepack cases clearly involved commercial, for-profit copy shops and the coursepacks were sold to students for a profit. By contrast, the e-reserves at issue were run by Georgia State University, a non-profit educational institution and the use was also a non-profit, educational use. This distinction is significant under the first fair use factor which looks at “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in rejecting the coursepack cases that in these cases:

. . . the nontransformative, educational use in question was performed by a for-profit copyshop, and was therefore commercial . . . [Courts have] refused to allow the defendants, who were engaged in commercial operations, to stand in the shoes of students and professors in claiming that their making of multiple copies of scholarly works was for nonprofit educational purposes.

However, in both of the coursepack cases, the courts expressly declined to conclude that the copying would fall outside the boundaries of fair use if conducted by professors, students, or academic institutions. See Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (“As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt. We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that the copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise.”); Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n.13 (“Expressly, the decision of this court does not consider copying performed by students, libraries, nor on-campus copyshops, whether conducted for-profit or not.”).

Reliance on the coursepack cases is therefore misguided as they involved off-campus, for-profit copy shops rather than non-profit educational institutions. The courts in these coursepack cases explicitly note that the holdings of these cases do not reach the issue of copying by students, professors, libraries, or the academic institutions. In Georgia State, the e-reserves system was clearly run by the university. The coursepack cases are therefore distinguishable based on the analysis done under the first fair use factor.

Additionally, the coursepack cases are clearly not binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit. These cases were decided in different jurisdictions – in a district court in New York and by the Sixth Circuit – and therefore not controlling. While the decisions in these cases may have had persuasive value, even if they had analogous fact patterns such opinions would not bind the Eleventh Circuit.

Finally, the decisions are more than 15 years old. Fair use jurisprudence is always evolving. There is no way to know if courts in the Second and Sixth Circuits would reach the same conclusion today that they reached in the last millennium.

While the media neutrality doctrine is an important copyright principle, it – and the coursepack cases – simply do not apply in the Georgia State decision. The Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected this holdings in this line of cases when considering the fair use of Georgia State’s e-reserves system.

In Georgia State University E-Reserves Case, Eleventh Circuit Endorses Flexible Approach to Fair Use

On Friday, October 17, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit released its long-awaited decision in the Georgia State University (GSU) e-reserves case. Some key takeaways from the majority opinion include:

  • Affirms that fair use is applied on a case-by-case basis;
  • Rejects bright-line rules, such as using a ten-percent-or-one-chapter rule to allow fair use (a rule that the district court adopted);
  • Affirms that even if a use is non-transformative, a nonprofit educational purpose can still favor fair use;
  • Rejects applicability of the coursepack copying cases;
  • Finds that a publisher’s failure to offer a license will tend to weigh in favor of fair use in terms of the fourth fair use factor; and
  • Gives weight to a publisher’s incentive to publish, rather than focusing on the author’s incentive to create.

Another positive aspect of the case is the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion of the purpose of copyright, affirming the fact (as has long been held by the Supreme Court) that copyright is not a natural right of the author, but rather, is designed to stimulate creativity and progress for the public good. Nancy Sims has an excellent analysis of the court’s ruling covering what she liked and didn’t like from the opinion.

It is important to note that while the case has been reversed and remanded, the Eleventh Circuit did not rule against GSU. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit directed the district court to revisit its fair use analysis and not to take an arithmetic approach to the four fair use factors (rejecting the notion that if three of the factors favor fair use, but one disfavors fair use, then fair use will always apply).

In fact, most of the publishers’ arguments were actually rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. Kevin Smith has a great summary of five arguments advanced by the publishers that were ultimately rejected by the Eleventh Circuit.

Thus, e-reserves remain alive and well, though the exact policies on fair use for e-reserves at some institutions may need to be revisited in light of this case, particularly those that rely on a checklist. Although the Eleventh Circuit’s methodology is binding only on Alabama, Florida and Georgia, this case is persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.

Here’s what the court had to say on each of the four use factors:

Factor One (the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes): While GSU’s use was non-transformative, the nonprofit educational purpose of the e-reserves favors fair use.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s finding on the first factor, determining that while the use of the Plaintiffs’ works was not transformative, the first factor favored GSU nonetheless. The court noted that the excerpts posted in the e-reserve system were verbatim copies converted into a digital form and were used for the same intrinsic purpose as the works. However, because GSU’s use was for a nonprofit educational purpose rather than a commercial purpose, the first factor favored GSU.

In finding that GSU’s use was for a nonprofit educational purpose, the court noted that the Supreme Court and Congress have favored fair use for educational purposes. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the user was a nonprofit educational institution and that the use of the works was clearly for educational purposes. It discussed the ways that GSU could have profited from the use or “commercially exploited” the work, but concluded that while Defendants could have profited from the use of the works (for example through collection of student tuition and fees) such reasoning is circular because any unlicensed use of a copyrighted work results in profit to the user and thus no use would qualify as nonprofit under the first factor. The Eleventh Circuit noted that GSU’s use of the works “provides a broader public benefit—furthering the education of students at a public university.” In sum, “despite the recent focus on transformativeness under the first factor, use for teaching purposes by a nonprofit, educational institution such as Defendants’ favors a finding of fair use under the first factor, despite the nontransformative nature of the use.”

Factor Two (nature of the copyrighted work): Factual works may include original expressive contents and relay more than bare facts, but this factor is of relatively little importance.

Here, the Eleventh Circuit states that highly creative works are entitled to greater protection, while the use of factual or informational work is more likely to favor fair use. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s holding that the second factor favored fair use in every instance because of the factual nature of the works-at-issue and found that the works still included expressive content. The court stated that where the works “surpass[] the bare facts necessary to communicate information, or derives from the author’s experiences or opinions, the District Court should have held that the second factor was neutral, or even weighed against fair use in cases of excerpts that were dominated by such material.” However, the court acknowledges that “the second fair use factor is of relatively little importance in this case,” noting that the works were neither fictional nor unpublished.

Factor Three (amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole): Blanket ten-percent-or-one-chapter rule is not appropriate; bright line rules must be avoided.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s formulation favoring fair use under the third factor where GSU copied no more than ten-percent of a work or one chapter in the case of a book with then or more chapters. The court notes, “We must avoid ‘hard evidentiary presumption[s] … and ‘eschew[] a rigid bright-line approach to fair use.’” The Eleventh Circuit rejects this formulation even as a starting point in the analysis, finding that “application of the same non-statutory starting point to each instance of infringement is not a feature of a proper work-by-work analysis.”

In its discussion of the third factor, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Classroom Guidelines as indicative of what is permitted under fair use. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Classroom Guidelines “do not carry force of law,” and furthermore, these guidelines “were intended to suggest a minimum, not maximum, amount of allowable educational copying that might be fair use, and were not intended to limit fair use in any way.” Here, the Eleventh Circuit references the coursepack cases, but finds that while they may provide guidance, they are not binding authority (both in terms of jurisdiction and the context).

Factor Four (effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work): Market substitution is the primary concern; failure to offer a license should generally weigh in favor of fair use.

On the fourth factor, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the adverse impact of primary concern is market substitution and “[t]he central question … is not whether Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works caused Plaintiffs to lose some potential revenue. Rather it is whether Defendants’ use—taking into account the damage that might occur if ‘everybody did it’—would cause substantial economic harm such that allowing it would frustrate the purposes of copyright by materially impairing Defendants’ incentive to publish the work.” The Eleventh Circuit’s apparent focus on the incentive to publish is a bit unusual, given that courts are generally focused on an author’s incentive to create rather than a publisher’s incentive to publish. Given the weight the Eleventh Circuit has given to a publisher’s incentive, academics should strongly consider open access publication options.

On the licensing point, the Eleventh Circuit found that “it is not determinative that programs exist through which universities may license excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works. In other words, the fact that Plaintiffs have made paying easier does not automatically dictate a right to payment … the ability to license does not demand a finding against fair use.” Furthermore, the court pointed to the lack of an available license as an “inference that the author or publisher did not think that there would be enough such use to bother making a license available” and in such cases, “the fourth factor should generally weigh in favor of fair use.

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the district court should have afforded the fourth factor greater weight due to the nontransformative nature of GSU’s use (as opposed to finding that each factor weighed equally in the district court’s arithmetic approach).

Ultimately, the district court will need to re-do its fair use analysis for each of the works-at-issue, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. In doing so, however, GSU could still prevail on its fair use claims.

Orphan Works/Mass Digitization Roundtables: Copyright and Fair Use Myths and Realities

During the orphan works roundtables, several participants attacked fair use and libraries, misstated the purpose of the copyright system in the United States, or inaccurately portrayed the activities of HathiTrust. Here are just some of the misconceptions or myths cited at the roundtable and responses to these inaccuracies:

Myth 1: Fair use is too uncertain

Some advocates of a legislative orphan works solution argued that legislation is necessary because fair use is too uncertain or unpredictable.

Reality: Fair use is a fairly predictable doctrine

Fair use is actually fairly predictable. Professor Pamela Samuelson wrote an article in 2009 entitled, Unbundling Fair Uses which concluded that “Fair use is both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases fall into common patterns.” In fact, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) pointed to this very article when proposing that Australia adopt a fair use provision. The ALRC went on to note that fair use factors can represent “a clear principled standard [that] is more certain than an unclear complex rule.” In recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, Professor Peter Jaszi (American University) similarly stated that fair use jurisprudence is predictable and coherent.

Myth 2: Recent fair use jurisprudence consumes Section 108 and renders the provision meaningless

Some have argued that applying fair use to activities not explicitly permitted under Section 108 makes this specific limitation, as well as others that libraries rely on, meaningless. They also suggest that fair use goes too far when applied where Section 108 does not apply.

Reality: Section 108(f)(4) includes an explicit savings clause that fair use still applies

Section 108(f)(4) provides that “Nothing in this section—in any way affects the rights of fair use as provided by section 107…” The plain language of the statute could not be any more clear: “Nothing … in any way affects the rights of fair use.” It is obvious that fair use applies even where a specific limitation or exception codified under Section 108 does not, subject of course to evaluation of the four fair use factors. Some argue against the plain language by asking what the purpose of Section 108 is if libraries can simply rely on the fair use provision of Section 107. Explicit limitations and exceptions can be beneficial in providing certainty for certain activities, particularly for those that are risk adverse, or apply where fair use might not. Libraries rely on a mix of purpose specific limitations and exceptions as well as fair use in order to achieve their public service mission and respond to evolving technology.

Myth 3: Fair use being used as an excuse by the library community to perform activities not covered by specific limitations or exceptions

Several participants claimed that fair use was just an excuse being used by the library community where specific limitations do not exist. Others argued that fair use has gone too far and has made copyright the exception to fair use.

Reality: Libraries are a conscientious and risk adverse community. Fair use is being used after careful thought and based on solid legal footing

Although there are numerous purpose specific limitations and exceptions that libraries rely upon, they do not cover every situation and fair use has long been relied upon where specific exceptions do not exist. Libraries are not pirates, but rather, are trusted institutions serving a public mission to provide access to knowledge and culture within the boundaries of the law.

The Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries notes that “how judges have interpreted fair use affects the community’s ability to employ fair use.” The practices of libraries are grounded in court decisions and judicial interpretations of the fair use doctrine.

Myth 4: Fair use clearly prohibits any uses that have an effect on the market

One commentator at the orphan works roundtable repeatedly argued that relying on fair use for any uses that have an affect on the market violates copyright law and is an infringement of a creator’s rights.

Reality: Fair use is a flexible standard and all four factors are considered together

Fair use is not designed to require satisfaction of all four statutory factors, but instead are considered together. The four factors include: 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value for the copyrighted work.

The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the factors are not to “be treated in isolation from one another. All are to be explored and weighed together, in light of copyright’s purpose” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Following this line of reasoning, circuit courts have confirmed that a defendant does not need to prevail on each of the four factors in order to successfully rely on fair use.

Myth 5: Copyright’s primary purpose is free expression and not to promote the public benefit

A disagreement broke out during one of the panels, with one person arguing that there is no legal basis for the argument that copyright’s primary purpose is to promote the public benefit.

Reality: The Constitution clearly states that the purpose of the intellectual property system is to “promote the progress of science of the useful arts” and the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to the importance of the public interest

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the constitutional rationale for the intellectual property system: “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that this clause is both a grant of power and a limitation for Congress.

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Court cited past precedent dating back to 1932 that “The copyright law, like the patent statutes makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration” and that “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors” (emphasis added). Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good” (emphasis added).

Additionally, fair use is an important limitation to copyright and has been upheld by the Supreme Court as a “First Amendment safeguard.”

Myth 6: Best practices in fair use are a contemporary/recent standard and not known by creators

One participant discounted the value of best practices because they have only been developed recently and have not withstood the test of time. Another suggested that the communities themselves did not create these best practices.

Reality: While many codes of best practices are recent, these practices contained within the codes have been used prior to being collected in a code

Codes of best practices do not appear out of thin air. The Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries, for example, was created in consultation with 150 research and academic librarians across the country. The Code of Best Practices draws upon the experiences of academic and research librarians and is a compilation of their best practices. Although not every librarian might agree with every principle, limitation or enhancement, as pointed out during the roundtable by one of the principal authors of this Code, Brandon Butler, such librarians are in the minority. While the aggregation of these best practices into a single document may have occurred recently, the practices themselves are not new to many libraries.

Myth 7: Digitization without authorization is not fair use. Other than the district courts in HathiTrust and Georgia State, courts have not approved of these types of activities.

Some participants discounted the district court decisions in HathiTrust and Georgia State University, noting that these cases were still in their first round and that circuit courts had yet to decide the case. Others stated that other than these two district courts, no courts have approved of these activities as fair use

Reality: Numerous circuits have upheld mirror image copies as transformative and applied fair use

Although HathiTrust and Georgia State University do involve new issues of mass digitization, several circuit courts have addressed whether mirror image or exact copying is fair use, finding that transformative copies are protected by fair use. The Fourth Circuit in A.V. v. iParadigms, for example found that using student papers to create a plagiarism database was protected under fair use. Similarly, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon as well as Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth Circuit found that using website images to create a search index constituted fair use. Likewise, the Second Circuit upheld fair use in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley for the use of concert posters in a book. These cases provided a solid basis for the HathiTrust _and _Georgia State University decisions and suggestions that the district courts went rogue and circuits have not approved of these types of activities are incorrect; circuit after circuit has upheld mirror image copying as fair use. While it is true that both HathiTrust and Georgia State University are on appeal, there are strong legal arguments supporting the application of fair use to mass digitization in these cases.

Recap of the Copyright Office’s Roundtables on Orphan Works and Mass Digitization

On March 10-11, 2014 the Copyright Office held roundtables on orphan works and mass digitization. These roundtables included nine sessions, most of which included sixteen panelists representing different organizations and perspectives.

There appeared to be little agreement on the vast majority of issues and opinions diverged widely. The greatest consensus seemed to be opposition to, or at least caution with, extended collective licensing; the Copyright Office noted, however, that some prior comments supported extended collective licensing solutions.

During the sessions, best practices, fair use, the issue of whether orphan works and mass digitization need to be treated separately, and licensing solutions were heavily referenced and discussed. Some individuals attacked recent fair use jurisprudence or claimed that their human rights were threatened by use of orphan works or mass digitization projects. Photographers in particular raised concerns that photographs are turned into orphans too quickly, particularly when images are put on the Internet. The library community seemed to agree on the vast majority of issues, with the exception of one representative from Rutgers University Libraries, and members of the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) spoke with one voice. Below are summaries from each session.

1) The need for legislation in light of recent legal and technological developments

The first point of disagreement centered around the issue of whether there is even a need for orphan works legislation. Most members of the library community, including the Library Copyright Alliance and a representative of Harvard University, noted that they were satisfied with recent fair use jurisprudence which diminished the need for orphan works legislation. This sentiment was echoed on the next panel by several other representatives of the library community. The Association of American Law Libraries stated their support for legislation in theory, but noted that there is a risk that legislation may not ultimately be a positive. CCIA noted that the complexity and regulatory nature of past orphan works proposals have made some stakeholders oppose a legislative solution.

Others, including Association of American Publishers, Wikimedia, Authors Guild, National Music Publishers’ Association and the representative of Rutgers University Libraries argued that orphan works legislation is needed. Some of those supporting orphan works legislation pointed out that their members or stakeholders value certainty.

In addition to the need for legislation, there were many references to fair use and best practices. Some representatives of rightsholder groups voiced their concern that their stakeholders were not consulted in development of best practices. Some participants noted their approval of recent fair use jurisprudence, while conceding that fair use does not address every issue. The Digital Library Copyright Project noted its project on best practices for use of orphan works for libraries and universities. Representatives of the library community continued to look favorably both on recent fair use jurisprudence and best practices, with the exception of the representative of Rutgers University Libraries who aligned with representatives of some rightsholder groups, including the National Music Publishers Association, American Society of Illustrators Partnership and the American Society of Journalists & Authors and argued that recent court cases on fair use have gone too far.

Although the Copyright Office did not want to engage in a debate over the copyright term, several participants pointed out that the lengthy copyright term in the United States of life plus seventy years has exacerbated the orphan works problem.

2) Defining a good faith “reasonably diligent search standard”

With respect to defining a reasonably diligent search standard, there was again no agreement or consensus view as to how it should be defined and whether a flexible or rigid approach would better solve the orphan works issue. Representatives of the library community encouraged flexible standards due to the differences in users, uses and circumstances that could influence the reasonableness of a search. Additionally, a rigidly defined standard would result in the law being unable to evolve and adapt to new technologies. The American Library Association noted that the searches conducted by librarians reveal sincere efforts to find the rightsholder. A representative of International Documentary Association and Film Independent, pointed out that overly rigid guidelines could result in failure because the legislation would not be used. The Society of American Archivists noted that a high standard for reasonably diligent search could prove too costly and make digitization efforts unsustainable.

Others suggested that a reasonably diligent search standard must have minimum standards and encouraged a more rigid approach in order to provide more certainty. The Motion Picture Association of America and the National Portrait Gallery representatives pointed out that minimum standards could still be flexible.

Some participants offered the following considerations in defining a reasonably diligent search: cost, commercial versus noncommercial intent, free market solutions, type of the work, age of the work and the use of the Copyright Office records. Another issue was whether a reasonably diligent search was possible for mass uses. There was no consensus on any of these issues.

Best practices were again referenced during this session, with many pointing out that they draw on the expertise of the community. Additionally, as noted by the International Documentary Association and Film Independent, best practices can evolve and there have been no specific allegations of misuse in these best practices. Responding to suggestions that the Copyright Office should facilitate drafting of best practices created by rightsholders and the user community, the Library Copyright Alliance pointed out that such negotiations would be long, delay the process at the outset, and could be fruitless, as evidenced by the widely diverging opinions expressed throughout the round table.

3) Role of private and public registries

The Society of American Archivists noted that registries cannot solve all issues and that the majority of orphan works are personal documents. SAA also cautioned that any solution must take into account the cost in searching for an orphan work.

Some of the panelists argued for global registries, while others advocated for voluntary opt-in registries or private registries. Some suggested that there is a need for multiple registries and that users of orphan works must find a way to search all the existing registries.

4) Types of works subject to any orphan works legislation, including issues related specifically to photographs

Much of the discussion centered on whether photographs should be included in an orphan works solution. The Association of American Publishers supported the idea that all works should be subjected to orphan works legislation. Other rightsholder groups specifically suggested a carveout for the interests they represented, such as for illustrators or musicians; others did not specifically advocate for a carveout but said that different works should be treated in a different manner. The Library of Congress pointed to the danger of excluding works such as photographs, because the same photographs are being used over and over again because of the fear in using orphaned works, skewing historical and cultural records.

The American Society of Media Photographers called artists “disenfranchised” and argued that creators would not be able to profit in an ongoing manner. The National Press Photographers Association said that there is a legitimate concern regarding finding the authors of older photographs, but noted that current photographs are instantly made orphans when they are uploaded to the Internet and stripped of their metadata.

The Digital Public Library of America advocated for “democratic access” to works, but the National Press Photographers Association opposed this idea.

During this panel, there was disagreement as to whether the Constitutional rationale of the copyright system is to promote the public benefit. Again, some panelists stated that fair use does enough to address orphan works concerns and already addresses some of the concerns discussed during the panel.

5) Types of users and uses subject to any orphan works legislation

While most panelists during this session seemed to suggest that legislation should cover both commercial and non-commercial users and uses, there was disagreement as to whether they should be treated equally. Additionally, some panelists during earlier sessions voiced disapproval for an orphan works solution that applied to commercial uses.

Several, including the Association of American Publishers, Association of Research Libraries, College Art Association, Writers Guild of America West, and the representative of Harvard University noted that the line between commercial and non-commercial can be difficult to define. Some noted that some non-profit institutions have gift shops or can engage in for-profit activities in order to sustain their non-profit work. Additionally, some commercial entities can provide genuine not-for-profit uses. The Association of American Publishers suggested that commercial entities are necessary because a legislative solution would likely be too complicated for individuals to take advantage of the legislation on their own, but who would be willing to pay for the value provided for by commercial interests.

Some panelists felt the distinction should not be whether a user is commercial or non-commercial, but that consideration should be given to whether a use is commercial or non-commercial. A representative from the Graphic Artists Guild argued that illustrators can clearly explain what are commercial uses and what are non-commercial uses, asserting that their industry would be destroyed if it were possible to use orphaned works for free in the commercial market. The Graphic Artists Guild also noted that non-commercial uses, such as for education and preservation, are already permitted under fair use.

Some arguments were made against making the law overly complicated because doing so could create confusion for individuals or, depending on the complexity, even for lawyers.

6) Remedies and procedures regarding orphan works

This session discussed limitations on monetary damages and injunctions. Most, but not all, participants supported limitations on injunctions because without such limits, no one would take advantage of a solution in which they must invest large amounts of money.

With respect to monetary damages, participants suggested the following: reducing or remitting statutory damages, remitting attorneys fees, and increasing damages for bad actors. Some felt that different standards for different works are appropriate and looking at the circumstances, such as the time or age of commercialization could be taken into account. A representative of the Digital Media Association opposed words like “reduce,” “remit,” or “increase,” arguing that the focus should be on reasonable compensation instead.

The National Press Photographers Association advocated heavily for a small claims court and stated that any orphan works solution should be tied to a willingness to participate in a small claims court.

The National Writers Union argued that the solutions being discussed resulted in blaming the victim and suggested that it is the users of orphan works that should be required to register and notify the public of the intent to use such works.

7) Mass digitization, generally

Throughout the roundtables, many participants argued that orphan works and mass digitization are different issues and must be separated. The panel on mass digitization was the most contentious of the all the panels spanning both days, with attacks on libraries and the Authors Guild making several explicit threats to sue libraries that digitize under a claim of fair use. The contentiousness of this panel highlighted the likely impossibility in coming together to find any solution.

Participants discussed whether fair use applied to mass digitization or whether its use goes too far. The Library Copyright Alliance pointed to several cases supporting the argument that digitization is considered fair use. Although some participants throughout the roundtables dismissed HathiTrust and Georgia State University because both case are on appeal the Library Copyright Alliance noted that the fair use argument is supported by a number of cases that have been decided by several circuits. Again, the library community largely supported the reliance on fair use for digitization projects, with the exception of the representative of Rutgers Universities Libraries. The representative of the University of Michigan, after several attacks on libraries and reliance on fair use, stated that the attacks were unfounded and that libraries are conscientious actors, not pirates. A representative from American University/Creative Commons USA stated that format shifting was clearly fair use, though questions may arise as to the uses after format shifting has taken place.

The Authors Guild disagreed and argued that digitization violates fair use and Section 108. The representative of the Authors Guild issued a “warning” that if libraries continue to digitize and argue fair use, then the Authors Guild would bring lawsuits for this type of behavior. The MPAA stated that it was comfortable with the case-by-case basis approach of fair use, but argued that it is impossible to consider application of fair use in a mass digitization case where you might have 20 million books. The National Press Photographers Association noted that one of the particular problems for photographers is the public perception that everything on the Internet is in the public domain.

As expected, some of the discussion covered the HathiTrust case. The representative of the National Press Photographers Association likened the case to Plessy v. Ferguson, a Supreme Court case from 1892 that upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine until being overturned by Brown v. Board of Education. The National Press Photographers Association argued that HathiTrust had been decided incorrectly and that just because Plessy v. Ferguson was the law for decades, it did not make the law right.

The representative from the Library of Congress pointed to the high costs of mass digitization, stating that it is not as simple as throwing a document into a scanner. He pointed out that there is a value add in what they do by making scans ADA compliant and that there is proper quality control, all of which results in costs to the institution. The Museum of Fine Arts, Boston added that digitization offers new benefits and value, such as providing 360 degree rotation of sculptures or vases, which would not otherwise be available.

8) Extended collective licensing and mass digitization and
9) Structure and mechanics of a possible extended collective licensing system in the United States

Sessions eight and nine overlapped, not only with respect to content but also with some of the same panelists. The participants at the sessions seemed to oppose or were at least wary of extended collective licensing.

Some pointed to the problems of collecting societies including that little money is actually distributed to the creators, there can be a lack of accountability, and they do not take into account the different interests of different authors. A couple of panelists also pointed out that extended collective licensing could come into tension with antitrust laws and that ultimately the states will end up with most fees due to unclaimed property laws.

Most panelists agreed that an individually negotiated license should be the first preference. Many panelists from rightsholder communities stated that voluntary licensing has worked in their communities. Many also pointed out that the United States does not have much history, tradition or experience with extended collective licensing regimes.

One participant noted that extended collective licensing creates an unnecessary tax and can damage fair use; only where fair use does not apply should one seek a license. This participant also pointed to the great value-add that has resulted from mass digitization projects undertaken by libraries.

The National Federation of the Blind cautioned against extended collective licensing because of the huge benefits that mass digitization has provided for persons who are blind or print disabled. He noted that anything that had a chilling effect on mass digitization would likely limit access for persons who are visually impaired and noted concerns with economic disincentives to digitize works.


Written comments are due to the Copyright Office by April 14, 2014. Judging from the discussions at the orphan works roundtable, however, it appears unlikely that the Copyright Office will be able to find a consensus view to please all stakeholders. The views expressed at the roundtable were widely divergent and it seems highly unlikely—given various threats and attacks on libraries as well as the extreme rhetoric regarding fair use—that all stakeholders could come together to find a solution. Even where it seemed like many participants agreed, such as opposing extended collective licensing regimes, the Copyright Office pointed out that some comments submitted in previous requests for comments supported such collective licensing.

TOMORROW!! Georgia State University Copyright Case: Post-Argument Panel

November 19, 2:00 pm, Rialto Center for the Arts

In 2012, the North Georgia District Court ruled largely in favor of Georgia State University in the ongoing copyright lawsuit initiated by Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Sage Publishers. The decision was the first federal court decision specifically addressing fair use and electronic reserves. Plaintiff publishers appealed on many points of the ruling.

Oral arguments in the Cambridge v. Becker (GSU Copyright) lawsuit are scheduled for the morning of November 19th at the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, room 339. Following the arguments, Georgia State University Library and American University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property will host a post-argument panel at 2:00 p.m. in the Rialto Center for the Arts lobby.


  • Brandon Butler, Moderator, Practitioner-in-Residence, Glushko Samuelson IP Clinic, American University, Washington College of Law

  • Tony Askew, Principal, Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC

  • Jonathan Band, Owner, Jonathan Band PLLC

  • Michael Landau, Professor, Georgia State University College of Law

  • Lisa Macklin, Director, Scholarly Communications Office, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University

  • Steve Schaetzel, Principal, Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC

  • Bruce Joseph, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP

The panel is free of charge, but registration is required to attend.

There will be a free live webcast of the event at http://www.livestream.com/georgiastate